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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an exchange economy a` la Shitovitz
(1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic
market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known
as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the
set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market
game and the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy
with which it is associated. We show, with an example, that even when
atoms are countably infinite, any Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation
of the game is not a Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange
economy. Accordingly, in the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we par-
tially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number
of atoms, without affecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the
measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any sequence
of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market games
associated with the partially replicated exchange economies approxi-
mates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange econ-
omy.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has been developed in the past decades, aiming at extend-
ing to a general equilibrium framework the classical Cournot (1838)’s theory
of oligopoly, where oligopolistic agents that interact noncooperatively among
them face a sector of consumers taking prices as given. The relevance of this
issue nowadays has been affirmed by Jean Gabszewicz in a recent contribu-
tion (see Gabszewicz (2013), p. 6): “Direct observation of economic activity
reveals that markets are the fields of “giants,” operating simultaneously with
a fringe of small competitors. [...] Behind the demand function there is a
myriad of “small” price-taking agents, while the supply side is occupied by
few agents appearing as giants, contrasting with the dwarfs on the demand
side.”
Most of the contributions on this issue belongs to two main lines of re-
search: the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach, initiated by Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972), and the strategic market game approach, initiated by Shap-
ley and Shubik (1977).
In their 1972’s paper, Gabszewicz and Vial transposed to a general equi-
librium setting Cournot’s original idea of an asymmetric economy with pro-
duction, in which firms with oligopolistic power that interact strategically
on quantities face a sector of consumers behaving a` la Walras. Nevertheless,
in the same paper, they pointed out two major difficulties inherent in the
standard Cournotian approach with strategic firms: first, profit maximiza-
tion may not be a rational objective for firms that have influence on prices;
second, the equilibrium is not independent from the rule chosen to normal-
ize prices. These difficulties have been overcome within the Cournot-Walras
approach by moving to the analysis of pure exchange economies (see Codog-
nato and Gabszewicz (1993), d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Ge´rard-
Varet (1997), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Shitovitz (1997), among oth-
ers). However, this latter class of models do not avoid a well-known problem
inherent in the Cournot-Walras approach: there, an equilibrium may not ex-
ists, even in mixed strategies, since the Walras price correspondence may fail
to admit a continuous selection (see Dierker and Grodal (1986)). A further
fundamental problem common to the whole Cournot-Walras approach is
that it leaves unexplained why some agents behave strategically while other
agents behave competitively.
A different approach has been developed (still in pure exchange), that
uses strategic market games a` la Shapley and Shubik with the aim at provid-
ing a formal explanation of perfectly and imperfectly competitive behavior.
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A fundamental contribution in this line is the paper of Okuno, Postlewaite
and Roberts (1980). In particular, since the work of these authors, results
in this direction have been obtained by incorporating within the framework
of strategic market games a mixed measure space of traders a` la Shitovitz
(1973), composed by large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders,
represented by an atomless part. In this setting, while all agents have a
priori the same strategic position, some of them turn out to have influence
on prices and some other turn out to be Walrasian, depending on their char-
acteristics and their weight in the economy. Then, the asymmetric structure
typical of the Cournotian theory is endogenously generated.
Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal ((2008), (2011)) obtained a general-
ization of Okuno et al.’s work by using a mixed version of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium model first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley, and known as
the Shapley window model (this model was analyzed, in the case of finite
economies, by Sahi and Yao (1989)). Busetto et al. (2011) provided an
endogenous explanation of oligopolistic and competitive behavior (see also
Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2013)). Moreover, working within this
strategic market game framework permitted them to show the existence of
an equilibrium in pure strategies, and then to overcome the non-continuity
problem which characterizes the Cournot-Walras approach.
This paper studies the link between Cournot and Walras equilibrium,
with the aim at providing a noncooperative foundation to the theory of per-
fect competition. A mixed exchange economy a` la Shitovitz is associated
with the same strategic market game a` la Shapley proposed by Busetto
et al. (2011). Within this framework, the relationship between the set of
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and
the Walras equilibrium allocations of the underlying exchange economy is
examined. We show, with an example, that even when the set of atoms is
countably infinite, there is the robust possibility that no Cournot-Nash equi-
librium allocation of the strategic market game is a Walras equilibrium of the
underlying exchange economy, because some atoms remain non-negligible in
size. This non equivalence result then motivates us to analyze the asymp-
totic relationship between appropriately defined sequences of Cournot-Nash
equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras equi-
librium allocations of the exchange economy. We do this by introducing
a concept of replication which we call a` la Cournot, since it extends to
a general equilibrium context the original Cournotian idea of replication:
that is, we partially replicate the economy by increasing only the number
of atoms, this way making them asymptotically negligible, without affect-
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ing the atomless part. At the same time, the mechanism of replication of
atoms is constructed in such a way that the measure space of traders re-
mains finite. If this requirement was not satisfied, the general equilibrium
model of oligopoly studied in the paper would not be well-defined. Our
main theorem establishes that any sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium
allocations of the strategic market game associated with the partially repli-
cated exchange economies approaches a Walras equilibrium allocation of the
original exchange economy.
To prove the limit theorem, we use analytical tools introduced by Sahi
and Yao (1989) to show their convergence result for finite economies, and
by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) to show their equivalence theorem a` la
Aumann. However, we have to tackle new technical issues due to the fact
that the space of traders has a mixed nature. To this end, we exploit some
tools previously applied to the Shapley’s window model for mixed economies
by Busetto et al. (2011). In particular, in order to determine the limit
points of the sequences of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations, we use
a version of the Fatou’s lemma in several dimensions proved by Artstein
(1979). Moreover, a key point in our paper is that since the Walrasian price
taking behavior of small traders is not assumed a priori, as in the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium models, but endogenously generated, we do not need to
impose any continuity assumption on the selections from the Walras price
correspondence.
The general equilibrium approach adopted here distinguishes our limit
result from the well-known results, obtained within the Cournotian tradition
in partial equilibrium establishing that the Cournot equilibrium approaches
the competitive equilibrium as the number of oligopolists goes to infinity
(see Frank (1965), Ruffin (1971), Novshek (1980), among others).
Our limit result is also different from existing results in the strategic
market game literature: within their Shapley’s window model for finite
economies, Sahi and Yao (1989) showed the convergence of sequences of
Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations to a Walras equilibrium allocation by
using a replication concept a` la Edgeworth, that is in which all types of agents
are replicated (on this kind of replication see Debreu and Scarf (1963)).
On the other hand, Codognato and Ghosal (2000) showed that the set
of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the Shapley’s model and the
set of the Walras equilibrium allocations coincide in economies a` la Aumann
(1964), where the space of agents is an atomless continuum.
Analogous results for limit exchange economies are obtained within the
Cournot-Walras approach by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993), for their
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prototypical model in pure exchange, and by Busetto et al. (2013), for the
new version of this model proposed by the same authors in the 2008’s paper.
Also limit results were obtained within the line opened by Gabszewicz
and Vial: see Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1983), and Novshek and Sonnen-
schein ((1983), (1987)), among others. All of them are obtained by using
replication concepts in which all types of agents are replicated. Moreover,
as stressed by Mas-Colell (1982) (see, in particular, pp. 203-204)), these
results depend in an essential way on the assumption that there exists a
continuous selection from the Walras price correspondence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build the mathemat-
ical model. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of a δ-positive Cournot-
Nash equilibrium used in the construction of the limit theorem, and we state
a theorem on its existence (the proof is in the Appendix). In Section 4, we
show the example on the non-equivalence between the sets of Cournot-Nash
and Walras equilibrium allocations when the atoms are countably infinite.
In Section 5, we introduce the replication a` la Cournot. In Section 6, we
state the existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equi-
librium (the proof is in the Appendix). In Section 7, we state and prove the
limit theorem.
2 The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy, E , with large traders, represented
as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space
of traders is denoted by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of
traders, T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real
valued, non-negative, countably additive measure defined on T . We assume
that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) <∞. This implies that the measure space
(T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T1 denote the set of
atoms and T0 = T \ T1 the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a
set of measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout
the paper. Thus, a statement asserted for “all” traders, or “each” trader,
or “each” trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for all such
traders except possibly for a null set of traders. The word “integrable” is to
be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are l different commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in Rl+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T → Rl+. There is a fixed initial
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assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for each t ∈ T .
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T x(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ.
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function
ut : R
l
+ → R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
l
+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t ∈ T .
Let B(Rl+) denote the Borel σ-algebra of Rl+. Moreover, let T
⊗B
denote the σ-algebra generated by all the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and
F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T × Rl+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T
and for each x ∈ Rl+, is T
⊗B-measurable.
We also need the following assumption (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Assumption 4. There are at least two traders in T1 for whom w(t) À 0,
ut is continuously differentiable in R
l
++, and {x ∈ Rl+ : ut(x) = ut(w(t))} ⊂
Rl++.
A price vector is a nonnull vector p ∈ Rl+.
A Walras equilibrium of E is a pair (p∗,x∗), consisting of a price vector
p∗ and an allocation x∗, such that, for each t ∈ T , ut(x∗(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all
y ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : p∗x = p∗w(t)}.
We define now the strategic market game, Γ, associated with E .
A strategy correspondence is a correspondence B : T → P(Rl2) such
that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {b ∈ Rl2+ :
∑l
j=1 bij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l},
where bij , i, j = 1, . . . , l, represents the amount of commodity i that trader
t offers in exchange for commodity j. A strategy selection is an integrable
function b : T → Rl2+, such that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given
a strategy selection b, we define the aggregate matrix B¯ = (
∫
T bij(t) dµ).
Moreover, we denote by b \ b(t) a strategy selection obtained by replacing
b(t) in b with b ∈ B(t). With a slight abuse of notation, b \ b(t) will also
represent the value of the strategy selection b \ b(t) at t.
Then, we introduce two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if,
for every pair (i, j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k = k(i, j) such
that a
(k)
ij > 0, where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.
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Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be
market clearing if
p ∈ Rl++,
l∑
i=1
pib¯ij = p
j(
l∑
i=1
b¯ji), j = 1, . . . , l. (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B¯ is irreducible. Then,
we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection
b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B¯ is
irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
bji(t) +
l∑
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
, if p ∈ Rl++,
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t), otherwise,
j = 1, . . . , l, for each t ∈ T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders’ final
holdings are determined according with this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)),
for each t ∈ T . It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to define a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ (see Codog-
nato and Ghosal (2000) and Busetto et al. (2011)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection bˆ such that ¯ˆB is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of Γ if
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for each b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .1
1Let us notice that, as this definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers
to irreducible matrices, it applies only to active equilibria of Γ, (on this point, see Sahi
and Yao (1989)).
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3 The existence of a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of Γ
In this section, we define the notion of a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium, which was first used by Sahi and Yao (1989) to prove their existence
theorem for the finite version of the Shapley’s model and their limit result.
We will use it, in this paper, for analogous purposes.
Let T¯1 ⊂ T1 be a set consisting of two traders in T1 for whom As-
sumption 4 holds. Moreover, let δ = mint∈T¯1{1l min{w1(t), . . . ,wl(t)}}.
We say that the correspondence Bδ : T → P(Rl2+) is a δ-positive strat-
egy correspondence if Bδ(t) = B(t) ∩ {b ∈ Rl2+ :
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥
δ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, for each t ∈ T¯1 and if Bδ(t) = B(t), for the
remaining traders t ∈ T . Moreover, we say that a strategy selection b is δ-
positive if b(t) ∈ Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T . Finally, we say that a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium bˆ of Γ is δ-positive if bˆ is a δ-positive strategy selection.
The following theorem shows the existence of a δ-positive Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Γ. It is a straightforward consequence of the existence theo-
rem in Busetto et al. (2011).
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, bˆ
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 An example
Sahi and Yao (1989) formalized the Shapley’s window model in the context
of an exchange economy with a finite set of traders. Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) reconsidered the Sahi and Yao’s model within an exchange economy
with an atomless continuum of traders. In this framework, they showed an
equivalence result a` la Aumann (1964) between the set of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium allocations of the window model and the set of the Walras equi-
librium allocations of the underlying exchange economy. The mixed measure
space we are considering here may contain countably infinite atoms. This
raises the question whether an equivalence result can be obtained also in
this case. The following example analyzes an exchange economy E with
countably infinite atoms and it shows that any Cournot-Nash equilibrium
allocation of the strategic market game Γ is not a Walras equilibrium allo-
cation of E .
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Example. Consider an exchange economy E where l = 2, T1 = T ′1 ∪ T ′′1 ,
T ′1 = {2, 3}, T ′′1 = {4, 5, . . .}, T0 = [0, 1]; w(2) = w(3)À 0, w(t) = (0, 1), for
each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0; ut(·) satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3, for each t ∈ T , u2(·)
and u3(·) satisfy Assumption 4, u2(x) = u3(x), ut(x) > ut(y), whenever
x ∈ Rl++ and y ∈ (Rl+ \ Rl++), for each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0; µ is the Lebesgue
measure, when restricted to T0, and µ(t) = (
1
2)
t, for each t ∈ T1. Then, if bˆ
is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and
xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ), for each t ∈ T , is not a Walras equilibrium of E .
Proof. Suppose that bˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ and that the
pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ), for each t ∈ T , is
a Walras equilibrium of E . Clearly, bˆ21(t) > 0, for each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0. Let
v =
∫
T ′′1 ∪T0 bˆ21(t) dµ. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for each t ∈ T
′
1, the
marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the rate at which he can trade
off commodity 1 for commodity 2 (see Okuno et al. (1980)). Moreover, at a
Walras equilibrium, this marginal price must be in turn equal to the relative
price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2. These two conditions are
expressed by the following equations:
dx2
dx1
= −(pˆ1)2 bˆ12(t)
bˆ21(t) + v
= −pˆ1,
for each t ∈ T ′1. But then, we must also have
bˆ21(2) + v
bˆ12(2)
=
bˆ21(2) + bˆ21(3) + v
bˆ12(2) + bˆ12(3)
=
bˆ21(3) + v
bˆ12(3)
. (2)
The last equality in (2) holds if and only if bˆ21(2) = z(bˆ21(3) + v) and
bˆ12(2) = zbˆ12(3), with z > 0. But then, the first and the last members of
(2) cannot be equal because
z(bˆ21(3) + v) + v
zbˆ12(3)
6= bˆ21(3) + v
bˆ12(3)
.
This implies that the pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ),
for each t ∈ T , cannot be a Walras equilibrium of E .
The example shows that the condition that E contains a countably in-
finite number of atoms is not sufficient to guarantee that the set of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of Γ coincides with the set of the Wal-
ras equilibrium allocations of E .
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5 The replication a` la Cournot of E
The non equivalence result obtained in the previous section leads us to deal
with the question whether a limit result can be instead obtained by replicat-
ing the exchange economy E and by generating sequences of Cournot-Nash
equilibrium allocations which converge to a Walras equilibrium allocation.
We address this question by introducing a concept of replication in the
original spirit of Cournot (1838). By analogy with the replication proposed
by Cournot in a partial equilibrium framework, the concept we propose is
obtained in fact by replicating only the atoms of E , while making them
asymptotically negligible, and without affecting the atomless part.
This partial replication a` la Cournot of E can be formalized as follows.
Let En be an exchange economy characterized as in Section 2, where each
atom is replicated n times. For each t ∈ T1, let tr denote the r-th element of
the n-fold replication of t. We assume that, for each t ∈ T1, w(tr) = w(ts) =
w(t), utr(·) = uts(·) = ut(·), r, s = 1, . . . , n, and µ(tr) = µ(t)n , r = 1, . . . , n.
Clearly, E1coincides with E .
Then, the strategic market game Γn associated with En can be character-
ized, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 2. Clearly, Γ1 coincides with Γ. A strat-
egy selection b of Γn is said to be atom-type-symmetric if bn(tr) = bn(ts),
r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1.
We provide now the definition of an atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Γn.
Definition 4. A strategy selection bˆ such that ¯ˆB is irreducible is an atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn if bˆ is atom-type-symmetric
and if
utr(x(tr, bˆ(tr), p(bˆ))) ≥ utr(x(tr, bˆ \ b(tr), p(bˆ \ b(tr)))),
for each b ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T1;
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for each b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T0.
6 The existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn
In this section, we introduce the notion of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn. Moreover, we state and prove that an
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equilibrium of this kind exists under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This result
is needed to show our limit theorem by using the replication a` la Cournot
introduced in Section 5.
Let δ be determined as in Section 3. Also a δ-positive strategy corre-
spondence, Bδ, is defined, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 3. Notice that
Bδ(tr) = Bδ(ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1. We say that a strategy
selection b is δ-positive if b(tr) ∈ Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and
b(t) ∈ Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T0. Then, we say that an atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ of Γn is δ-positive if bˆ is a δ-positive strategy
selection.
The following theorem establishes the existence of a δ-positive atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn. The proof of the theorem
adapts to our context tools and arguments developed by Say and Yao (1989)
and Busetto et al (2011) to show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the Shapley’s window model, respectively in the case of a finite set of
traders and in the case of a mixed measure space of traders a` la Shitovitz.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive
atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn, bˆ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
7 The limit theorem
In this section, we state and prove the limit theorem. It establishes that
the sequences of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations generated by repli-
cating E a` la Cournot approximate a Walras equilibrium allocation of the
economy. In particular, the theorem shows that, given a sequence of atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of Γn, for n = 1, 2, . . .,
there exists a Walras equilibrium allocation of E with this property: for each
trader t ∈ T , the assigment corresponding to this Walras equilibrium allo-
cation is a limit point of the sequence of final holdings of t associated with
the sequence of atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria of Γn, for
n = 1, 2, . . ..
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let {bˆn} be a sequence of
strategy selections of Γ and let {pˆn} be a sequence of prices such that bˆn(t) =
bˆΓ
n
(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, bˆn(t) = bˆΓn(t), for each t ∈ T0, and
pˆn = p(bˆΓ
n
), where bˆΓ
n
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Γn, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, (i) there exists a subsequence
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{bˆkn} of the sequence {bˆn}, a subsequence {pˆkn} of the sequence {pˆn}, a
strategy selection bˆ of Γ, and a price vector pˆ, with pˆ À 0, such that bˆ(t)
is the limit of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point
of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, the sequence {Bˆkn} converges
to ¯ˆB, and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to pˆ; (ii) xˆ(t) is the limit of the
sequence {xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, and xˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence
{xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, where xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ) for each t ∈ T , xˆkn(t) =
x(t, bˆkn(t), pˆkn), for each t ∈ T , and for n = 1, 2, . . .; (iii) the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a
Walras equilibrium of E .
Proof. (i) Let {bˆn} be a sequence of strategy selections of Γ and let {pˆn}
be a sequence of prices such that bˆn(t) = bˆΓ
n
(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each
t ∈ T1, bˆn(t) = bˆΓn(t), for each t ∈ T0, and pˆn = p(bˆΓn), where bˆΓn
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn, for
n = 1, 2, . . .. The fact that the sequence {Bˆn} belongs to the compact
set {bij ∈ Rl2 : bij ≤
∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, the sequence {bˆn(t)} belongs to the com-
pact set Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T1, and the sequence {pˆn}, belongs, by Lemma
9 in Sahi and Yao, to a compact set P, implies that there is a subse-
quence {Bˆkn} of the sequence {Bˆn} which converges to an element of the
set {bij ∈ Rl2 : bij ≤
∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, a subsequence {bˆkn(t)} of the sequence
{bˆn(t)} which converges to an element of the set Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T1,
and a subsequence {pˆkn} of the sequence {pˆn} which converges to an el-
ement pˆ of the set P . Moreover, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao, pˆ À 0.
Since the sequence {bˆkn} satisfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Art-
stein (1979), there is a function bˆ such that bˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence
{bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆkn(t)},
for each t ∈ T0, and such that the sequence {Bˆkn} converges to ¯ˆB. (ii)
Let xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ) for each t ∈ T , xˆkn(t) = x(t, bˆkn(t), pˆkn), for each
t ∈ T , and for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, xˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence {xˆkn(t)},
for each t ∈ T1, as bˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each
t ∈ T1, and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to pˆ, xˆ(t) is a limit point of
the sequence {xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, as bˆ(t) is a limit point of the
sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to
pˆ. (iii) BˆΓn = Bˆn as bˆΓ
n
ij =
∑
t∈T1
∑n
r=1 bˆ
Γn
ij (tr)µ(tr) +
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
Γn
ij (t) dµ =∑
t∈T1 nbˆ
n
ij(t)
µ(t)
n +
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
n
ij(t) dµ =
∑
t∈T1 bˆ
n
ij(t)µ(t)+
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
n
ij(t) dµ = bˆ
n
ij ,
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i, j = 1, . . . , l, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, pˆn = p(bˆn) as pˆn and bˆn satisfy (1), for
n = 1, 2, . . .. But then, by continuity, pˆ and bˆ must satisfy (1). Therefore,
Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao implies that
¯ˆ
B is completely reducible. More-
over, bˆ(t) ∈ Bδ(t) since bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for
all t ∈ T . Then, bˆ is δ-positive. But then, by Remark 3 in Sahi and Yao,
¯ˆ
B must be irreducible. Consider the pair (pˆ, xˆ). It is straightforward to
show that the assignment xˆ is an allocation as pˆ and bˆ satisfy (1) and that
xˆ(t) ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for all t ∈ T . Suppose that (pˆ, xˆ) is not a
Walras equilibrium of E . Then, there exists a trader τ ∈ T and a commodity
bundle x˜ ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). By Lemma
5 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000), there exist λ˜j ≥ 0, ∑lj=1 λ˜j = 1, such
that
x˜j = λ˜j
∑l
i=1 pˆ
iwi(τ)
pˆj
, j = 1, . . . , l.
Let b˜ij = w
i(τ)λ˜j , i, j = 1, . . . , l. Then, it is straightforward to verify that
x˜j = wj(τ)−
l∑
i=1
b˜ji +
l∑
i=1
b˜ij
pˆi
pˆj
,
for each j = 1, . . . , l. Consider the following cases.
Case 1. τ ∈ T1. Let {hn} denote a sequence such that hn = kn, if
k1 > 1, hn = kn+1, otherwise, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ρ denote the k1-th
element of the n-fold replication of E and let BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ) denote the ag-
gregate matrix corresponding to the strategy selection bˆΓ
hn \ b˜(τρ), where
b˜(τρ) = b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ∆BˆΓhn , ∆BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), and ∆Bˆhn denote
the diagonal matrices of row sums of, respectively, BˆΓhn , BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), and
Bˆhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Moreover, let qΓ
hn
, qΓ
hn
τρ , and q
hn denote the vec-
tors of the cofactors of the first column of, respectively, ∆BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn ,
∆BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ) − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), and ∆Bˆhn − Bˆhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Clearly,
qΓ
hn
= qhn as BˆΓhn = Bˆhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ∆
¯ˆ
B be the diagonal matrix
of row sums of
¯ˆ
B and q be the cofactors of the first column of ∆
¯ˆ
B− ¯ˆB. The
sequences {qΓhn} and {qhn} converge to q as the sequence Bˆhn converges
to
¯ˆ
B and qΓ
hn
= qhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let w¯ = max{w1(τ), . . . ,wl(τ)}.
Consider the matrix BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, bˆΓhnij −
bˆΓ
hn
ij \ b˜ij(τρ) = ( 1n bˆΓ
hn
ij (τρ) − 1n b˜ij(τρ)), i, j = 1, . . . , l, for n = 1, 2, . . ..
But then, the sequence of Euclidean distances {‖BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)‖}
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converges to 0 as | 1n bˆΓ
hn
ij (τρ) − 1n b˜ij(τρ)|= 1n |bˆΓ
hn
ij (τρ) − b˜ij(τρ)| ≤ 1n w¯,
i, j = 1, . . . , l, n = 1, 2, . . .. The sequence {BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)} converges to
¯ˆ
B as, by the triangle inequality, ‖BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)} − ¯ˆB‖ ≤ ‖BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \
b˜(τρ)‖+‖BˆΓhn − ¯ˆB‖ = ‖BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)‖+‖Bˆhn− ¯ˆB‖, for n = 1, 2, . . .,
and the sequences {‖BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)‖} and {‖Bˆhn− ¯ˆB‖} converge to 0.
Then, the sequence {qΓhnτρ } converges to q. uτρ(x(τρ, bˆΓ
hn
(τρ), p(bˆΓ
hn
))) ≥
uτρ(x(τρ, bˆ
Γhn \ b˜(τρ), p(bˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)))) as bˆΓhn is a δ-positive atom-type-
symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let bˆhn \ b˜(τ)
be a strategy selection obtained by replacing bˆhn(τ) in bˆhn with b˜, for
n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hn(τ), qΓ
hn
)) ≥ uτ (x(τ, bˆhn \ b˜(τ), qΓhnτρ )) as
bˆhn(τ) = bˆΓ
hn
(τρ), p(bˆΓ
hn
) = αhnq
Γhn , with αhn > 0, by Lemma 2 in
Sahi and Yao, bˆΓ
hn \ b˜(τρ) = bˆhn \ b˜(τ), and p(bˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)) = βhnqΓ
hn
τρ ,
with βhn > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, for n = 1, 2, . . .. But then,
uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (x˜), by Assumption 2, as the sequence {bˆhn(τ)} converges to
bˆ(τ), the sequence {qΓhn} converges to q, the sequence {qΓhnτρ } converges to
q, and pˆ = θq, with θ > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, a contradiction.
Case 2. τ ∈ T0. Let {bˆhkn (τ)} be a subsequence of the sequence {bˆkn(τ)}
which converges to bˆ(τ). Moreover, let bˆΓ
hkn \ b˜(τ) be a strategy se-
lection obtained by replacing bˆhkn (τ) in bˆΓ
hkn with b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . ..
uτ (x(τ, bˆ
Γhkn (τ), p(bˆΓ
hkn ))) ≥ uτ (x(τ, bˆΓ
hkn \b˜(τ), p(bˆΓhkn \b˜(τ)))) as bˆΓhkn
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γhkn , for
n = 1, 2, . . .. Let bˆhkn \ b˜(τ) be a strategy selection obtained by replacing
bˆhkn (τ) in bˆhkn with b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . ... Then, uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hkn (τ), pˆhkn )) ≥
uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hkn \ b˜(τ), pˆhkn )) as bˆhkn (τ) = bˆΓhkn (τ), pˆhkn = p(bˆΓhkn ), bˆΓhkn \
b˜(τ) = bˆhkn \ b˜(τ), and pˆhkn = p(bˆΓhkn \ b˜(τ)). But then, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (x˜),
by Assumption 2, as the sequence {bˆhkn (τ)} converges to bˆ(τ) and the se-
quence {phkn} converges to pˆ, a contradiction.
Hence, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium of E .
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Busetto et al. (2011) showed that, under Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, bˆ, such
that, for each t ∈ T , bˆ(t) ∈ Bδ(t). This implies that bˆ is a δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let us introduce a slightly perturbed version of the
game Γn, denoted by Γn(²). Given ² > 0 and a strategy selection b, we
define the aggregate bid matrix B¯² = (b¯ij + ²). Clearly, the matrix B¯
² is
irreducible. The interpretation is that an outside agency places fixed bids
of ² for each pair of commodities (i, j). Given ² > 0, we denote by p²(b) the
function which associates, with each strategy selection b, the unique, up to
a scalar multiple, price vector which satisfies
l∑
i=1
pi(b¯ij + ²) = p
j(
l∑
i=1
(b¯ji + ²)), j = 1, . . . , l. (3)
Then, let us introduce the following notion of equilibrium for Γn(²).
Definition 5. Given ² > 0, a strategy selection bˆ² is an atom-type-symmetric
²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²) if bˆ² is atom-type-symmetric and
utr(x(tr, bˆ
²(tr), p²(bˆ²))) ≥ utr(tr, bˆ² \ b(tr), p²(bˆ² \ b(tr)))),
for all b ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T1;
ut(x(t, bˆ
²(t), p²(bˆ²))) ≥ ut(t, bˆ² \ b(t), p²(bˆ² \ b(t)))),
for all b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T0.
Moreover, we say that an atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium bˆ² of Γn(²) is δ-positive if bˆ² is a δ-positive strategy selection.
To show Theorem 2, we first need to prove the existence of a δ-positive
atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²). To do so, we
apply, as in Busetto et al. (2011), the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem
(see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 583).
We neglect, as usual, the distinction between integrable functions and
equivalence classes of such functions and denote by L1(µ,R
l2) the set of
integrable functions taking values in Rl
2
, by L1(µ,B(·)) the set of strategy
selections, and by L1(µ,B
∗(·)) the set of atom-type-symmetric strategy se-
lections. Note that the locally convex Hausdorff space we shall be working
in is L1(µ,R
l2), endowed with its weak topology.
The proof of existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of Γn(²) is articulated in three lemmas.
The first lemma establishes the properties of L1(µ,B
∗(·)) required to
apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem.
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Lemma 1. The set L1(µ,B
∗(·)) is nonempty, convex and weakly compact.
Proof. L1(µ,B
∗(·)) is nonempty, convex and it has a weakly compact clo-
sure by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to prove their
Lemma 1. Now, let {bm} be a convergent sequence of L1(µ,B∗(·)). Since
L1(µ,R
l2) is complete, {bm} converges in the mean to an integrable func-
tion b. But then, there exists a subsequence {bkm} of {bm} such that
bkm(tr) converges to b(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and bkm(t) con-
verges to b(t), for each t ∈ T0 (see Theorem 25.5 in Aliprantis and Burkin-
shaw (1998), p. 203). The compactness of B(t), for each t ∈ T , and the
fact that bkm(tr) = bkm(ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, implies that
b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)). Hence L1(µ,B∗(·)) is norm closed and, since it is also
convex, it is weakly closed (see Corollary 4 in Diestel (1984), p. 12).
Now, given ² > 0, let α²tr : L1(µ,B
∗(·)) → B(tr) be a correspondence
such that α²tr(b) = argmax{utr(x(t,b\b(tr), p²(b\b(tr)))) : b ∈ B(tr)}, r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and let α²t : L1(µ,B(·))→ B(t) be a correspondence
such that α²t(b) = argmax{ut(x(t,b\ b(t), p²(b\ b(t)))) : b ∈ B(t)}, for each
t ∈ T0. Let α² : L1(µ,B∗(·)) → L1(µ,B(·)) be a correspondence such
that α²(b) = {b ∈ L1(µ,B(·)) : b(tr) ∈ α²tr(b), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈
T1, and b(t) ∈ α²t(b), for each t ∈ T0}.
The second lemma provides us with the properties of the correspondence
α². The proof is obtained by readapting to our context the arguments used
to show Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011), and we omit it here.
Lemma 2. Given ² > 0, the correspondence α² : L1(µ,B
∗(·))→ L1(µ,B(·))
is such that the set α²(b) is nonempty and convex, for all b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)),
and it has a weakly closed graph.
Now, given ² > 0, let α²δtr : L1(µ,B
∗(·)) → B(tr) be a correspon-
dence such that α²δtr(b) = α
²
tr(b) ∩ Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1,
and let α²t : L1(µ,B(·)) → B(t) be a correspondence such that α²δt (b) =
α²t(b) ∩ Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T0. Let α²δ : L1(µ,B∗(·)) → L1(µ,B(·)) be a
correspondence such that α²δ(b) = {b ∈ L1(µ,B(·)) : b(tr) ∈ α²δtr(b), r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and b(t) ∈ α²δt (b), for each t ∈ T0}. Moreover,
let α²δ∗ : L1(µ,B∗(·))→ L1(µ,B∗(·)) be a correspondence such that α²δ∗(b) =
α²δ(b) ∩ L1(µ,B∗(·)).
We are ready to prove the existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²).
Lemma 3. Given ² > 0, there exists a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²), bˆ².
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Proof. Let ² > 0 be given. By Lemma 6 in Sahi and Yao (1989), we know
that, for each b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)), α²δtr(b) is nonempty, r = 1, . . . , n, for each
t ∈ T¯1. Moreover, for each b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) and for each t ∈ T1, there
exists b¯ ∈ B(t) such that b¯ ∈ α²δtr(b), r = 1, . . . , n as b is an atom-type-
symmetric strategy profile. But then, by the same argument of Lemma 2 in
Busetto et al. (2011), α²δ∗(b) is nonempty. The convexity of α²δ(b), for each
b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)), is a straightforward consequence of the convexity of α²tr(b)
and Bδ(t), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and of α²t(b) and Bδ(t), for each
t ∈ T0. But then, α²δ∗ is convex valued as L1(µ,B∗(·)) is convex. α²δtr is upper
hemicontinuous and compact valued, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, as it is the
intersection of the correspondence α²tr, which is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued by Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011), and the continuous
and compact valued correspondence which assigns to each strategy selection
b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) the strategy set Bδ(tr) (see Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis
and Border (2006), p. 567). Moreover, α²δt is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued, for each t ∈ T0, using the same argument. Therefore,
α²δ has a weakly closed graph, by the same argument used in the proof of
Lemma 2. Finally, α²δ∗ has a weakly closed graph as it is the intersection of
the correspondence α²δ and the continuous correspondence which assigns to
each strategy selection b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) the weakly closed set L1(µ,B∗(·))
which, by the Closed Graph Theorem (see Theorem 17.11 in Aliprantis and
Border (2006), p. 561), has a weakly closed graph (see Theorem 17.25 in
Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 567). But then, by the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg Theorem (see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.
583), there exists a fixed point bˆ² of the correspondence α²δ∗ and hence a
δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we have to show that there exists
the limit of a sequence of δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash
equilibria and that this limit is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of Γn. Following Busetto et al. (2011), in this part of the
proof we essentially refer to Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao (1989) and a gener-
alization of the Fatou’s lemma in several dimensions provided by Artstein
(1979).
Then, let ²m =
1
m , m = 1, 2, . . .. By Lemma 3, for each m = 1, 2, . . .,
there is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ²m .
The fact that the sequence {Bˆ²m} belongs to the compact set {bij ∈ Rl2 :
bij ≤ n
∫
T1
wi(t) dµ +
∫
T0
wi(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥
n
∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, the sequence {bˆ²m(tr)} belongs to the
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compact set Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and the sequence {pˆ²m},
where pˆ²m = p(bˆ²m), for eachm = 1, 2, . . ., belongs, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and
Yao (1989), to a compact set P, implies that there is a subsequence {Bˆ²km}
of the sequence {Bˆ²m} which converges to an element of the set {bij ∈
Rl
2
: bij ≤ n
∫
T1
wi(t) dµ +
∫
T0
wi(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij +
bji) ≥ n
∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, a subsequence {bˆ²km (tr)} of the
sequence {bˆ²m(tr)} which converges to an element of the set Bδ(tr), r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and a subsequence {pˆ²km} of the sequence {pˆ²m}
which converges to an element of the set P . Since the sequence {bˆ²km}
satisfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979), there is a function
bˆ such that bˆ(tr) is the limit of the sequence {bˆ²km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for
each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆ²km (t)}, for each t ∈ T0,
and such that the sequence {Bˆ²km} converges to ¯ˆB. Then, bˆ(tr) = bˆ(ts)
as {bˆ²km (tr)} = {bˆ²km (ts)}, r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and bˆ(tr) is
the limit of the sequence {bˆ²km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1. Hence,
it can be proved, by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to
show their existence theorem, that bˆ is an atom-type-symmetric δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²).
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